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Abstract
Border-based Anonymization Method for Sharing Private Spatial-Temporal Data
Hani AbuSharkh
Many location-based software applications have been developed for mobile devices. Conse-
quently, location-based service providers often have a detailed trajectory history of their service
recipients. The collected spatial-temporal information of their service recipients can be invalu-
able for other organizations and companies in many ways; for example, it can be used for direct
marking, market analysis, and consumer behavior analysis. Yet, releasing the spatial-temporal
data together with other user-specific data in its raw format often leads to privacy threats to the
service recipients. In this thesis, we study the problem of spatial-temporal data publishing with
the consideration of preserving both privacy protection and information utility for data mining.
The contributions are in twofold. First, we propose a service-oriented architecture to determine
an appropriate location-based service provider for a given data request. Second, we present a
border-based data anonymization method to transform a raw spatial-temporal data table into an
anonymous version that preserves both privacy and information utility. Empirical results suggest
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Turn on any smartphone and it is not too difficult to identify some location-based applications, such
as a navigation system and social-networks applications. These location-based applications not
only provide convenient, customized location-based services to the recipients but they also collect
a large volume invaluable user-specific spatial-temporal information for the location-based service
providers and their partners. Yet, simply sharing the raw data with their partners will compromise
the privacy of the service recipients. The objective of this study is to propose a service-oriented
architecture together with a privacy-preserving spatial-temporal data anonymization algorithm to
preserve both the privacy of the service recipients and the information utility for data mining.
Figure 1 provides an overview of the research problem. The location-based service providers
collect and store a large volume of user-specific spatial-temporal data in their private databases.
Some third parties (data miners) would like to obtain an appropriate set of spatial-temporal data to
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Figure 1: Overview of Spatial-Temporal Data Sharing
challenge is to develop a service-oriented architecture so data miners can identify the location-
based service provider(s) who own the data through a service broker. The second challenge is to
efficiently anonymize the spatial-temporal data in order to fulfill the data requests. In our model, we
do not require the service broker to be a trustworthy entity. Therefore, the data must be anonymized
when released by the location-based service providers.
A user-specific spatial-temporal data table contains a collection of spatial-temporal records.
Each record consists of a sensitive attribute of a user and a spatial-temporal path that represents
the sequence of visited locations with timestamps.
A spatial-temporal data table T is a collection of records in the form 〈(loc1t1) → . . . →
(locntn)〉 : s1, . . . , sp : d1, . . . , dm, where 〈(loc1t1) → . . . → (locntn)〉 is the spatial-temporal
2
path, si ∈ Si are the sensitive attributes, and di ∈ Di are the quasi-identifying attributes (QID) of
an object. The sensitive and the QID attributes are object-specific data in the form of relational
data. Publishing a table T , which might be for reference or analytical purposes, raises the problem
of privacy.
Motivating Example
We use an example to demonstrate the potential privacy risks of releasing the spatial-temporal
data in its raw format.
Suppose a location-based service provider wants to share Table 1 with a data miner. Record
2, for example, shows that a user with sensitive value s3 visited locations f , h, and e at times 6,
7, and 8, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume that each record contains only one
sensitive attribute in this example.
We identify and address two types of privacy linkage attacks [20]:
Record linkage: a privacy attack in which the adversary exploits the uniqueness of a path
in the released data table. If a path is so specific that it only matches a small number of other
paths, linking the victim’s record from the released spatial-temporal data table and the sensitive
value may become possible. The assumption is that the adversary possesses some knowledge
about the locations and timestamps (doublets) existing in a victim’s path. Suppose one of the data
miners is an adversary who knows that the data record of a target victim, Daphne, is in Table 1.
This adversary also knows that Daphne has visited g2 and b3. Daphne’s record, together with her
sensitive value s1, can be uniquely identified because Record 1 is the only record that contains g2
and b3. The adversary can also determine Daphne’s other visited locations, such as d4, f6, and h7.
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Table 1: Raw Spatial-Temporal Data Table
Rec# Path Sensitive ...
1 〈g2→ b3→ d4→ f6→ h7〉 s1 ...
2 〈f6→ h7→ e8〉 s3 ...
3 〈b3→ d4→ f6→ e8〉 s4 ...
4 〈g2→ c5→ h7→ e8〉 s3 ...
5 〈b3→ h7→ e8〉 s4 ...
6 〈c5→ f6→ e8〉 s2 ...
7 〈g2→ f6→ h7→ e8〉 s2 ...
8 〈g2→ c5→ f6→ h7〉 s1 ...
Attribute linkage: a privacy attack that occurs when a group of records that share some com-
bination of doublets contains a frequently appearing sensitive value. Even though a target victim’s
record might not be identified, inferring the victim’s sensitive value from such a group becomes
possible. Suppose the adversary knows that Keith has visited g2 and f6. Since two of the three
records (Records 1, 7, 8) containing g2 and f6 have sensitive value s1, the adversary can infer that
Keith has s1 with 2/3 = 67% confidence.
We do not require the service broker to be a trustworthy entity in our model, which means that
the data publisher is not trusted and may attempt to identify sensitive information from record own-
ers. We also assume that the data miner could be an attacker. Thus, the data must be anonymized
when released by the location-based service providers.
Spatial-temporal data are very different from traditional relational data due to their special
properties:
• High dimensionality: This is an intrinsic characteristic of spatial-temporal data due to the
huge number of possible combinations of locations and timestamps. Consider a subway
system having 50 stations that operate 20 hours a day. The total number of dimensions of
the data table could be 50 x 20 = 1000 dimensions. Each dimension (doublet) could be a
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potential piece of knowledge used by an adversary to perform record or attribute linkages;
therefore, every dimension is considered a potential quasi-identifying (QID) attribute. If we
apply a traditional privacy model, such as K-anonymity, all dimensions would be included
in a single QID and every path would have to be indistinguishable from at least K-1 other
paths. In order to achieve K-anonymity, the highly dimensional nature of spatial-temporal
data would likely cause most of the data to be suppressed. Consequently, the utility of the
resultant anonymous data would be insufficient for further data analysis.
• Sparseness: Each path in spatial-temporal data is relatively short. Anonymizing these short,
little-overlapping paths in a high-dimensional space poses a significant challenge for tra-
ditional anonymization techniques because it is difficult to identify and group the paths
together. Enforcing traditional K-anonymity on high-dimensional and sparse data would
render the data useless.
• Sequentiality: The order of items in each sequence should be kept and considered; for exam-
ple, a1 → b2 is different from b2 → a1. As a result, the number of possible combinations
in sequential data is much higher than the number of possible combinations in set-valued
data. In addition, in any path, timestamps are always increasing; therefore, sequences such
as a2→ a1 are not valid, as an object cannot go from time 2 to time 1.
In the research area of privacy-preserving data publishing [20], many anonymization algo-
rithms have been proposed to thwart record linkages and attribute linkages in relational data. Yet,
the privacy models they employed, such as K-anonymity [38] [41] and its extensions [22] [32]
[33] [50] [51], are not applicable to high-dimensional spatial-temporal data [4].
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We adopt a novel privacy model, LKC-privacy, that addresses the challenges of spatial-
temporal data. LKC-privacy provides a practical solution to compensate for an adversary’s back-
ground knowledge.
1.1 Contribution
Our contributions can be summarized as follows: First, based on the practical assumption that
an adversary has limited knowledge, we adopt the LKC-privacy model [36] to address the special
challenges of anonymizing high-dimensional, sparse, and sequential spatial-temporal data. Sec-
ond, we propose a service-oriented architecture to determine an appropriate location-based service
provider for a given data request. Third, we present an efficient border-based anonymization algo-
rithm to achieve LKC-privacywhile preserving frequent sequences in the anonymous data. Finally,
extensive experimental results suggest that our anonymization method is effective for information
preservation and is scalable.
1.2 Outline of Thesis
In Chapter 2, we explain the concept of LBS and demonstrate the potential threats to privacy that
stem from publishing raw data. Next we present different models proposed to protect the relational
data. Then we discuss different techniques developed to anonymize high-dimensional data, and
finally we present anonymization methods to protect location privacy.
Chapter 3 formally defines the problem. We define information utility, followed by a descrip-
tion of the LKC-privacy model and problem statement.
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Chapter 4 presents a service-oriented architecture for privacy-preserving spatial-temporal data
sharing.
Chapter 5 presents our proposed anonymizing algorithm, the concept and the construction of
the borders, the counting function, and a detailed explanation of the steps in the border-based
algorithm.
Chapter 6 presents an empirical study of the algorithm with a focus on information-utility loss
and scalability.





The use of Location-Based Services (LBS) has increased in the last few years. Publishing the col-
lected data in raw format may violate the privacy of service recipients, and many privacy protection
studies have been published. In this chapter we explain the concept of LBS and demonstrate the
potential threats to privacy that stem from publishing raw data. Next we present different models
proposed to protect the relational data. Then we discuss different techniques used to anonymize
high-dimensional data, and finally we present anonymization methods to protect location privacy.
2.1 Location-Based Services
Location-Based Service is defined as an information service accessible through the mobile network
by mobile devices, and it utilizes the location of the mobile device [44]. OpenGeospatial Consor-
tium defines LBS as a wireless-IP service that uses geographic information to serve a mobile user.
8
Figure 2: LBS as an Intersection of Technologies [10]
Location and time of an object are usually sent through the Internet to some spatial (or spatial-
temporal) database. LBS can be considered as an intersection of three following technologies: a
spatial-temporal database, the Internet, and New Information and Communication Technologies
(NICTs) [39]. Figure 2 demonstrates the LBS dimensions.
A typical LBS system consists of the following five components [40], as shown in Figure 3:
• Mobile device: a pocket-size computing device that can request services from providers. It
can be a mobile phone, PDA, or other mobile device. This device sends and receives location
and time information about the object.
• Communication network: the means through which a mobile device transfers the data back
and forth. It can be a Wireless Local Network (WLAN), the Internet, or another network.
• Positioning components: a service used to determine the position of user service recipients.
Examples include GPS, WLAN, and other communication networks.
• Service and application provider: a company or agency that offers a specific service on the
network. For example, some mobile applications provide the recipient with the location of
9
Figure 3: The Basic Components of an LBS [40]
the nearest cinema.
• Data and Content Provider: a party who collects the data or information, who may not be
the service provider. Service providers may acquire the data from other data and content
providers.
The use of LBS has significantly increased in the last few years. LBS applications include
tracking, navigation, emergency services, billing, LBS-alerts, social networking, network operator
applications, and many end-user applications [47]. However, collecting information about recipi-
ents raises many concerns if people are tracked by their positions or by analyzing their preferences
and action history. On one hand the analysis helps business applications get a perfect customer
model, but on the other raises users’ fears about privacy invasion.
In our model, the data collected through different LBSs is passed to a data broker, an indepen-
dent third party who researches information and data for clients, including different organizations.
To address the problem of privacy, the collected data is anonymized before the service provider
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transmits it to a data broker.
Next we present an overview of the data anonymization approach and the different privacy
models that were used to achieve the same purpose.
2.2 Privacy Protection on Relational Data
Many privacy-preserving data publishing techniques have been proposed for anonymizing rela-
tional data. We provide a high-level summary of the literature in this section. Relational data are
typically stored in tables of the form:
D(Explicit Identifier, Quasi Identifier, Sensitive Attributes,Non-Sensitive Attributes).
Sweeney showed in [41] that even with the removal of explicit identifiers, privacy can still be
violated through the linking attacks explained in Chapter 1. She indicated a real-life threat to a
former governor of the state of Massachusetts. She linked the governor’s name in a public voter
list with his record in a published medical database by combining the zip code, date of birth, and
sex, as shown in Figure 4.
A combination of personal attributes, called a quasi-identifier, can be used to identify an indi-
vidual’s record. In the above example, the victim was re-identified by linking his quasi-identifier
and the victim’s record in released data. It was not difficult for the attacker to obtain her boss’s
zip code, date of birth, and sex, gender which served as the quasi-identifier. She also noticed that
her boss was hospitalized, and therefore knew that her victim’s medical record would appear in the
released patient database.
11
Figure 4: Linking to Re-identify Record Owner [41]
2.2.1 Preserving Threats
Privacy threat occurs when an attacker is able to link a record owner to a record in a published
data table, or to a sensitive attribute in a published data table. We call these events record linkage
and attribute linkage. In the two types of linkages, we assume that the attacker knows the QID
of the victim, we further assume that the attacker knows that the victim’s record is in the released
table, and seeks to identify the victim’s record or sensitive information from the table. A data
table is considered to preserve privacy if it can effectively prevent the attacker from successfully
performing these linkages.
2.2.2 Privacy Models
Privacy-preserving techniques on spatial-temporal data can be broadly grouped into two categories:
data collection and data sharing. While the work on data collection focuses on the privacy and
security issues of the sensors and readers at the communication level [30], the work in the data
sharing phase focuses on privacy and utility at the data level [25].
In traditional K-anonymity [38] [41], if one record in the table has some value qid, at least
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k-1 other records also have the value qid. In other words, the minimum group size on QID is at
least k. A table satisfying this requirement is called k-anonymous. In a k-anonymous table, each
record is indistinguishable from at least k- 1 other records with respect to QID. Consequently, the
probability of linking a victim to a specific record through QID is at most 1/k.
Machanavajjhala et al [33] propose a diversity model called ℓ-diversity. The purpose is to pre-
vent attribute linkage. The ℓ-diversity requires every qid group to contain at least ℓwell-represented
sensitive values. However, this model cannot prevent probabilistic inference attacks because some
sensitive values are naturally more frequent than others in a group, enabling an attacker to conclude
that a record in the group is very likely to have those values.
Confidence bounding [46] attempts to prevent attribute linkage. It bounds the confidence of
inferring a sensitive value from a qid group by specifying one or more privacy templates of the
form 〈QID → s, h〉; s is a sensitive value, QID is a quasi-identifier, and h is a threshold. Let
Conf(QID → s) be max{conf(qid → s)} over all qid groups on QID, where Conf(QID →
s) denotes the percentage of records containing s in the qid group. A table satisfies 〈QID → s, h〉
if Conf(QID → s) ≤ h. In other words, 〈QID → s, h〉 bounds the attacker’s confidence of
inferring the sensitive value s in any group on QID to the maximum h.
The (α, k)-anonymity [50] privacy model requires every qid in a Table T to be shared by at least
k records and Conf(qid → s) ≤ α for any sensitive value s, where k and α are data publisher-
specified thresholds. However, it does not limit an adversary’s knowledge, which results in high
utility loss of data; additionally, it may result in high distortion if the sensitive values are skewed.
[51] proposes the notion of personalized privacy to allow each record owner to specify her own
privacy level. This model assumes that each sensitive attribute has a taxonomy tree and that each
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record owner specifies a guarding node in this tree. However, record owner privacy is violated if
an attacker is able to infer any domain-sensitive value within the subtree of her guarding node with
a probability, called breach probability, greater than a certain threshold.
Various cryptographic solutions [55], anonymous communications [11] [29], and statistical
methods [48] have been proposed in which only authorized and trustworthy recipients are given
the private key to access the data. However, it is difficult to guarantee that all staff in a given
company are trustworthy. Our assumption defines the problem and solutions differently from the
encryption and cryptographic approaches: Data miners and recipients are not trustworthy; thus,
the data must be anonymized when released by the location-based service providers.
2.2.3 Anonymization Operations
Typically, a raw data table does not satisfy a specified privacy requirement and the table must be
modified before being published.
The modification is composed of a sequence of anonymization operations that can be broadly
divided into three categories as follows:
• Generalization and Suppression: Generalization and suppression aims at hiding some details
in QID. Generalization replaces some values with a parent value in the taxonomy of an
attribute.
In a full-domain generalization scheme [31] [38] [41], all values in an attribute are general-
ized to the same level of the taxonomy tree. In a Subtree generalization scheme [7] [22] [28] [31] [21],
at a non-leaf node either all child values or none are generalized. The sibling generalization
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scheme [31] is similar to the subtree generalization except that some siblings may remain
ungeneralized. A parent value is then interpreted as representing all missing child values. In
the cell generalization scheme [31] [49] [52], also known as local recoding, some instances
of a value may remain ungeneralized while other instances are generalized.
Suppression on the other hand removes or deletes any value that can be used to launch
the attack. There are also several different suppression schemes: Record suppression [7]
[28] [31] [38] refers to suppressing an entire record. Value suppression [45] [46] refers to
suppressing every instance of a given value in a table. Cell suppression (or local suppression)
[13] [34] refers to suppressing some instances of a given value in a table.
• Anatomization and Permutation: Anatomization [51], unlike generalization and suppression,
does not modify the quasi-identifier or the sensitive attribute, but instead deassociates the
relationship between the two. Precisely, the method releases the data on QID and the data
on the sensitive attribute in two separate tables: a quasi-identifier table QIT contains the
QID attributes, a sensitive table ST contains the sensitive attributes, and both QIT and
ST have one common attribute, GroupID. All records in the same group will have the
same value ofGroupID in both tables, and are therefore linked to the sensitive values in the
group in exactly the same way. If a group has ℓ distinct sensitive values and each distinct
value occurs exactly once in the group, then the probability of linking a record to a sensitive
value by GroupID is 1/ℓ. The attribute linkage attack can be distorted by increasing ℓ.
Permutation shares the same spirit of anatomization. In [57], Zhang et al. proposed an
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approach called permutation. The idea is to deassociate the relationship between a quasi-
identifier and a numerical sensitive attribute by partitioning a set of data records into groups
and shuffling their sensitive values within each group.
• Perturbation: The general idea is to replace the original data values with synthetic data
values so that the statistical information computed from the perturbed data does not signifi-
cantly differ from the statistical information computed from the original data. The perturbed
data records do not correspond to real-world record owners, so the attacker cannot perform
sensitive linkages or recover sensitive information from the published data.
2.3 Anonymizing High-Dimensional Data
As discussed in Chapter 1, temporal-spatial data is high-dimensional. K-anonymity and the other
privacy-preserving models mentioned so far suffer from the curse of high dimensionality [4] and
render the high-dimensional data useless for data mining.
In this thesis, we solve the problem of high dimensionality by assuming that the adversary
knows at most L doublets of a victim’s locations and the corresponding times. Mohammed [36]
proposed a LKC-privacy model that addresses the privacy issues on high-dimensional relational
data. In contrast, this thesis proposes an anonymization algorithm to achieve the LKC-privacy
model on spatial-temporal data. Furthermore, none of the tested traditionalQID-based anonymiza-
tion methods mentioned above, namely [22] [31] [33], are scalable to handle the high-dimensional
data in our experiments. K-anonymity [38] [41], confidence bounding [46], and (α, k)-anonymity [50]
are special cases of the LKC-privacy model; our anonymization algorithm can also be viewed as
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a scalable solution for achieving these traditional privacy models. Dwork [16] proposed a privacy
model called differential privacy that ensures that the removal or addition of a single data record
does not significantly affect the overall privacy of the database. Most of the works in differential
privacy are based on the interactive privacy model, where the result of a query is in the form of
aggregation [14] [17]. Yet, differential privacy may not prevent linkage attacks.
Other recent work has focused on anonymizing high-dimensional transaction data [3] [24] [43]
[53] [54]. In [3] Aggarwal and Yu formalized an anonymity model for the sketch-based approach,
and utilized it to construct sketch-based privacy-preserving representations of the original data.
The sketch-based approach [6] reduces the dimensionality of the data by generating a new repre-
sentation with a much smaller number of features, where each one uses a different set of random
weights to produce a weighted sum of the original feature values. This technique is quite effective
for high-dimensional data sets, as long as the data is sparse. The sketch-based method provides
privacy protection while allowing effective reconstruction of many aggregate distance measures.
Therefore, it can be used for a variety of data mining algorithms such as clustering and classifica-
tion.
The models suggested in [53] and [54] limit the adversary’s power by a maximum number of
known items as background knowledge in order to solve the problem of high dimensionality. This
assumption is similar to ours, but our problem has two major differences. First, a transaction is a set
of items, but a spatial-temporal path is a sequence of visited location-time doublets. Sequential data
drastically increases the computational complexity for counting the support counts as compared to
transaction data. Hence, their proposed models are not applicable to spatial-temporal data. Second,
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we have different privacy and utility measures. The privacy model of [43] is based on only K-
anonymity and does not consider attribute linkages. [53] [54] measure their data utility in terms of
preserved item instances and frequent itemsets, while we measure the utility based on the number
of preserved frequent sequences. Xu et al. [53] use a border-based method, but it was not used for
sequential or spatial-temporal data.
2.4 Location Privacy
Location anonymity is achieved by mixing the user’s identity and request with those of other
users. Examples of such techniques are Mix Zones [9], cloaking [26], and location-based k-
anonymity [23]. The objectives of these techniques are very different from the solution presented
in this thesis. First, their goal was to anonymize an individual user’s identity resulting from a set of
LBS requests, but our goal is to anonymize high-dimensional data. Second, they dealt with small
dynamic groups of users, but we anonymize a large static data set. Hence, their problem is very
different from that of spatial-temporal data publishing.
In [2], Papadimitriou et al studied the privacy issue in publishing time-series data and exam-
ined the trade-offs between time-series compressibility and partial information hiding and their
fundamental implications for how one should introduce uncertainty about individual values by
perturbing them. The study found that by making the perturbation similar to the original data,
we can both preserve the structure of the data better, and simultaneously make breaches harder.
However, as data becomes more compressible, a fraction of the uncertainty can be removed if true
values are leaked, revealing how they were perturbed.
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2.5 Anonymizing Moving Objects
Moving-object data poses new challenges to traditional database, data mining, and privacy-preserving
technologies due to its unique characteristics: time-dependency, location-dependency, and high di-
mensionality. Some recent works [19] [27] [37] [42] [56] address the anonymity of moving objects.
Abul et al. [1] proposed a new privacy model called (k, δ)-anonymity that is an extension of
traditional K-anonymity. It exploits the inherent uncertainty of moving objects’ locations. Their
method relies on a basic assumption that every path is continuous. In the 3-dimensional repre-
sentation, a path is a polyline (x, y, t) where the coordinates (x, y, t) of each point in the polyline
represent the moving object’s location(x, y) at a specific time t. A minimum of k objects should
appear within the radius of δ of the path of every moving object in the same period of time. To
achieve the previous privacy requirement for a target data set, [2] uses space translation to change
the location coordinates of some points on certain polylines. Figure 5 depicts the model. Although
this assumption is valid for some spatial-temporal devices where the object can be traced all the
time, it does not hold for others. Another major difference is that this model achieves anonymity by
space translation that changes the actual location of an object. In contrast, our approach employs
suppression for anonymity and thus preserves the data truthfulness and frequent sequences with
true support counts.
In [27] an uncertainly-aware privacy algorithm for GPS traces is presented. The researchers
selectively removed doublets to increase uncertainly between paths to hinder identification. The
works target GPS-only traces and cannot be employed for anonymizing other spatial-temporal data,
so the mechanism cannot be generalized for all spatial-temporal data.
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Figure 5: A Graphical Representation of an Uncertainty Trajectory Volume [1]
The privacy model proposed in [42] assumes that different adversaries have different back-
ground knowledge about the spatial-temporal paths, and thus their objective is to prevent adver-
saries from gaining any further information from the published data. They consider the locations
in a path as sensitive information and assume that the data holder has the background knowledge
of all the adversaries. In reality, such complete information is difficult to obtain.
Pensa et al. [37] proposed a k-anonymity notion for sequence datasets. The proposed algo-
rithm also aims to preserve frequent sequential patterns. However to achieve anonymity, they
transformed a sequence into the other by insertion, deletion, or substitution of a single item. Thus,
their approach also spoils data truthfulness.
Yarovoy et al. [56] consider time as a QID attribute. However, there is no fixed set of times
for all moving objects. Each spatial-temporal path has its own set of times as its QID. It is unclear
how the data holder could determine the QID attributes for each trajectory.
Fung et al. [18] [19] and Chen et al. [12] propose a method for anonymizing spatial-temporal
data without preserving frequent sequences. Mohammed et al. [35] present a tree-based anonymiza-
tion method to preserve both privacy and maximal frequent sequences. In contrast, this thesis
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A data miner wants to perform a data mining task on a user-specific spatial-temporal dataset, and
wants to obtain the dataset from some location-based data service providers. The data miner speci-
fies a data request to a spatial-temporal data broker who is responsible for identifying the location-
based service providers who own the requested data. The research problem is how to transform the
raw spatial-temporal data (e.g., Table 1) into an anonymous version that simultaneously preserves
both the privacy of the underlying users and utility of the information for data mining.
In this chapter, we first define the format of user-specific spatial-temporal data, followed by
the LKC-privacy model [36], and the information utility measure in the context of spatial-temporal
data. Finally, we provide the problem statement.
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3.1 User-Specific Spatial-Temporal Data
We formally define the format of a user-specific spatial-temporal data table as follows: A user-
specific spatial-temporal dataset is a collection of spatial-temporal records in which each user’s
record consists of four types of information:
• Explicit identifiers are attributes that can uniquely identify a user, e.g., name, SSN, and phone
number.
• Quasi-identifiers (QID) are some combinations ofQID values may identify a user, e.g., job,
age, and gender. They are not explicit identifiers.
• Sensitive attributes contain some sensitive information that a user may not want other people
to know, e.g., disease and financial status.
• Spatial-temporal information is a sequence of locations visited by a user within a period of
time, e.g., 〈a1→ c4→ b7〉.
Explicit identifiers, e.g., name, SSN, and ID, are removed. Note, we keep the ID in our exam-
ples for discussion purposes only. The spatial-temporal data, the user-specific QID, and sensitive
attributes are assumed to be important for the data mining task; otherwise, they should be removed.
Definition 3.1.1 (Doublet) A doublet, denoted by ℓitimei, is a combination of location ℓi and
timestamp ti.
Definition 3.1.2 (Spatial-temporal path) A spatial-temporal path, denoted by 〈ℓ1t1, . . . , ℓntn〉,
is a sequence of doublets sorted by the timestamps in ascending order, representing a sequence of
locations visited by a user between timestamps t1 and tn, inclusively.
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A timestamp is the entry time to a location. A user is assumed to be staying in the same
location until detected again in another location. A user may revisit the same location at different
times but consecutive doublets having the same location are considered redundant and, therefore,
are removed. For example, in 〈c1 → c2 → c3 → d4 → c5〉, c2 and c3 are removed but c1, d4,
and c5 are kept. At any time, a user can appear in at most one location, so 〈a1→ b1〉 is not a valid
spatial-temporal path. In other words, the timestamps increase monotonically in a spatial-temporal
path.
Definition 3.1.3 (User-specific spatial-temporal table) A user-specific spatial-temporal table (or
simply a spatial-temporal table) T consists of a collection of records in the form [〈ℓ1t1, . . . , ℓntn〉,
a1, . . . , ay, s1, . . . , sm], where 〈ℓ1t1, . . . , ℓntn〉 is a spatial-temporal path, a1, . . . , ay are quasi-
identifying values, and s1, . . . , sm are sensitive values of a user.
3.2 Information Utility
The measure of information utility varies depending on the data mining task to be performed
on the published data. In this thesis, we aim at preserving the frequent sequences. A sequence
q = 〈ℓ1t1 → . . .→ ℓntn〉 is an ordered set of doublets.
Definition 3.2.1 (Frequent sequence) A sequence q is frequent in a spatial-temporal table T if
|T (q)| ≥ K ′, where T (q) is the set of records in T containing q and K ′ is a minimum support
threshold.
F (T ) denotes the set of frequent sequences in T with respect toK ′. Frequent sequences capture
the major traffic flows [8] and often form the information basis for different primitive data mining
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tasks on sequential data, e.g., association-rules mining [5]. In the context of spatial-temporal data,
association rules can be used to determine the subsequent locations of a moving object given the
previously visited locations. This knowledge is important for workflow mining [25].
If q is a frequent sequence, every subsequence p with p ⪯ q is also a frequent sequence.
3.3 Privacy Model
One data miner, who is an adversary, seeks to identify the record or sensitive values of some target
victim in T . As explained earlier, we assume that the adversary knows at most L doublets that the
victim has previously visited. We use ρ to denote such a prior known sequence of doublets, where
|ρ| ≤ L. Based on the prior knowledge ρ, the adversary could identify a group of records, denoted
by T (ρ), that “contains" ρ. A record in T contains ρ if ρ is a subsequence of the spatial-temporal
path in the record. For example in Table 1, Records #1,2,7,8 contain ρ = 〈f6 → h7〉, written as
T (ρ) = {Records#1, 2, 7, 8}. Based on T (ρ), the adversary could launch two types of privacy
attacks.
The first type of privacy attack is record linkage. Given prior knowledge ρ, T (ρ) is a set of
candidate records that contains the victim’s record. If the group size of T (ρ), denoted by |T (ρ)|, is
small, then the adversary may identify the victim’s record from T (ρ) and, therefore, the victim’s
sensitive value. For example, if ρ = 〈g2 → b3〉 in Table 1, T (ρ) = {Record#1}. Thus, the
adversary can easily infer that the victim’s sensitive value is s1.
The second type of privacy attack is attribute linkage. Given prior knowledge ρ, the adversary
can identify T (ρ) and infer that the victim has sensitive value s with confidence P (s|ρ) = |T (ρ∧s)||T (ρ)| ,
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where T (ρ ∧ s) denotes the set of records containing both ρ and s. P (s|ρ) is the percentage of
records in T (ρ) containing s. The privacy of a victim is at risk if P (s|ρ) is high. For example,
given ρ = 〈g2 → f6〉 in Table 1, T (ρ ∧ s1) = {Records#1, 8} and T (ρ) = {Records#1, 7, 8};
therefore, P (s1|ρ) = 2/3 = 67%.
To thwart the record and attribute linkages, we adopt the LKC-privacy model [36], which was
originally proposed for relational data, and we apply the model in the context of spatial-temporal
data. Intuitively, LKC-privacy requires that every sequence with a maximum length L in the
spatial-temporal table has to be shared by at least a certain number of records, and the ratio of
sensitive value(s) in every group cannot be too high.
Definition 3.3.1 (LKC-privacy) Let L be the maximum length of the prior knowledge. Let S be
a set of sensitive values. A spatial-temporal data table T satisfies LKC-privacy if and only if for
any non-empty sequence q with |q| ≤ L of any spatial-temporal path in T ,
1. |T (q)| ≥ K, where K > 0 is an integer anonymity threshold, and
2. P (s|q) ≤ C for any s ∈ S, where 0 < C ≤ 1 is a real number confidence threshold.
A location-based service provider specifies the thresholds L, K, and C. The maximum length
L reflects the assumption of the adversary’s power. LKC-privacy guarantees the probability of a
successful identity linkage to be ≤ 1/K and the probability of a successful attribute linkage to be
≤ C.
Intuitively, a sequence q with |q| ≤ L is a violation in T with respect to a given LKC-privacy
requirement if T (q) violates at least one of the conditions in Definition 3.3.1.
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Definition 3.3.2 (Violating sequence) Let q be a sequence of a spatial-temporal path in T with
0 ≤ |q| ≤ L. q is a violating sequence with respect to a LKC-privacy requirement if |T (q)| < K
or P (s|q) > C for any sensitive value s ∈ S. V (T ) denotes the set of violating sequences in T
with respect to a LKC-privacy requirement.
Observation 3.3.1 If q is a violating sequence, every supersequence p with q ⪯ p and |q| ≤ L is
also a violating sequence.
Example 3.3.1 Let L = 2, K = 2, C = 50%, and S = {s1}. In Table 1, a sequence q1 = 〈g2 →
d4〉 is a violating sequence because |T (q1)| = 1 < K. A sequence q2 = 〈g2 → f6〉 is a violating
sequence because P (s1|q2) = 67% > C. However, a sequence q3 = 〈g2 → c5 → f6 → h7〉 is
not a violating sequence even if |T (q3)| = 1 < K and P (s1|q3) = 100% > C because |q3| > L.
In order to achieve LKC-privacy, it is not correct to ignore sequences of size less that L. In
other words, if a table T satisfies LKC-privacy it does not mean it satisfies LK´C-privacy, where
L′ < L.
Lemma 1 LKC-privacy is not monotonic with respect to adversary’s knowledge L.
Proof. To prove that LKC-privacy is not monotonic with respect to L, it is sufficient to prove
that one of the conditions of LKC-privacy in Definition 1 is not monotonic. In the following we
provide a counterexample for both conditions:
Condition 1: K is not monotonic with respect to L. In other words, If all of the size-L se-
quences are nonviolating, it does not guarantee that a sequence with size L′ ≤ L is also nonviolat-
ing. For example, in Table 2, though the size-3 sequences satisfy privacy requirement for K = 2,
the size-2 sequence, q = 〈a1→ d2〉 does not satisfy the requirement.
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Table 2: Counterexample for Monotonic Property
ID Path Sensitive ...
1 〈a1→ d2〉 s1 ...
2 〈a1→ b2〉 s3 ...
3 〈a1→ b2→ c3〉 s3 ...
4 〈a1→ b2→ c3〉 s4 ...
Condition 2: C is not monotonic with respect to L. If q is a nonviolating sequence with
P (s|q) ≤ C and |T (q)| ≥ K, its subsequence q′ may or may not be a nonviolating sequence. For
example in Table 2, the sequence q = 〈a1 → b2 → c3〉 satisfies P (s3|q) = 50 ≤ C. However, its
subsequence q′ = 〈a1→ b2〉 does not satisfy P (s3|q′) = 100% > C.
Therefore, in LKC-privacy, it is not sufficient to assure that every sequence q satisfies both
conditions given length L in T . Instead, we have to ensure that every sequence q with length
not greater than L satisfies the conditions. To overcome this bottleneck, we suppress the minimal
violating sequences that exist within the violating sequences which sufficient to satisfy the LKC-
privacy model.
In our model, we use global suppression [20] to remove the violating sequences. Global sup-
pression means deleting the item from all transactions that contain the item. Such item suppression
has the following properties:
1. Suppressing an item eliminates all sequences that contain the item.
2. Suppressing an item does not alter any sequence and its support that does not contain the
item.
3. Suppressing an item does not introduce a new sequence.
We adopt the LKC-privacy model because it has the following desirable properties that are
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important for anonymizing high-dimensional data:
The data holder has the capability to determine the values of L, K, and C. This gives the data
holder the flexibility to determine the level of privacy based on the holder’s needs.
LKC-privacy guarantees the probability of a successful identity linkage to be ≤ 1/K, and the
probability of a successful attribute linkage to be ≤ C.
The LKC privacy model is flexible to adjust the trade-off between data privacy and data utility,
and between an adversary’s power and data utility. Increasing L and K, or decreasing C, would
improve the privacy at the expense of data utility.
LKC-privacy generalizes several traditional privacy models. K-anonymity [38] [41] is a spe-
cial case of LKC-privacy with C = 100% and L = |d|, where |d| is the number of dimensions,
i.e., number of distinct doublets, in the table. Confidence bounding [46] is a special case of LKC-
privacy with K = 1 and L = |d|. (a, k)-anonymity [49] is also a special case of LKC-privacy
with L = |d|, K = k, and C = a. Thus, the data holder can still achieve the traditional models, if
needed.
LKC-privacy is a general privacy model that thwarts both identity linkage and attribute link-
age. It is also a privacy model that is applicable to anonymize spatial-temporal data with or without
sensitive attributes.
3.4 Problem Statement
The research problem studied in this thesis can be summarized in two subproblems:
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1. Given a data mining request, the problem is to develop an effective service-oriented archi-
tecture to determine the appropriate location-based service providers who own the data that
satisfies the data mining request, and to establish a connection session between each service
provider and the data miner.
2. Given a spatial-temporal table T , a LKC-privacy requirement, a minimum support threshold
K ′, and a set of sensitive values S, the problem is to identify a transformed version of T that
satisfies the LKC-privacy requirement while preserving the maximum number of frequent
sequences |F (T )|.
The information sharing process can be divided into two phases. In the first phase (Chap-
ter 4), the data broker receives requests from data miners and establishes connections with the
location-based service providers who contribute their data in a privacy-preserving manner. In the
second phase (Chapter 5), the location-based service providers anonymize their spatial-temporal
data based on their own privacy requirement and the data miner’s information utility requirement,
and then they submit the anonymous data to the data broker, who will then pass it to the data miner.
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Chapter 4
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) for
Sharing Private Spatial-Temporal Data
In this chapter we present a service-oriented architecture for sharing private spatial-temporal data.
Figure 6 depicts an overview of the communication channels of the participants. Given a data
request, the data broker plays the central role in identifying the contributing location-based service
providers and presenting the final anonymous data to the data miner. The architecture does not
require the data broker to be a trusted entity. This makes our architecture practical because a
trusted party is often not available in real-life scenarios.
The objective of this phase is to establish a common session context among the contributing
location-based service providers and the data miner in four steps: data miner authentication, con-
tributing data providers identification, session initialization, and requirements negotiation.
Data miner authentication: The data broker first authenticates a data miner to the requested
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Figure 6: Service-Oriented Architecture for Privacy-Preserving Spatial-Temporal Data Sharing
service providers accessible by the data miner.
Contributing service providers identification: Next, the data broker queries the data schema
of the accessible location-based service providers to identify which can contribute data for the
requested service. To facilitate more efficient queries, the broker could periodically pre-fetch data
schema from the service providers, or the providers could update their data with the broker.
Session initialization: Next, the data broker notifies all contributing location-based service
providers with the session identifier. All prospective service providers share a common session
context that represents a stateful presentation of information related to a specific execution of a
spatial-temporal data anonymization algorithm called ST-Anonymizer, which will be discussed in
Chapter 5. Due to the fact that multiple parties are involved and the flow of multiple protocol mes-
sages is needed in order to fulfill the data integration, we use Web Service Resource Framework
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(WSRF) to keep the stateful information along an initial data request. An established session con-
text stored as a single web service resource contains several attributes to identify a ST-Anonymizer
process with end-point reference (EPR), the client address, the data providers’ addresses and their
certificates, and an authentication token that contains the data miner’s certificate.
Requirements negotiation: The data broker is responsible for communicating the negotiation
of privacy and information requirements among the data providers and the data miner. Specifi-
cally, this step involves negotiating the price, the privacy requirement in Definition 3.3.1, and the




A spatial-temporal data table satisfies a given LKC-privacy requirement if all violating sequences
with respect to a given LKC-privacy requirement are removed. The objective of this phase is
to anonymize a spatial-temporal table by eliminating all violating sequences while preserving as
many frequent sequences as possible. We first present the algorithm used to compute the violat-
ing sequences; followed by the suppression algorithm; then, a border-based representation of the
violating sequences, frequent sequences, and the counting function; finally, we brief the steps of a
border-based suppression algorithm.
5.1 Computing Violating Sequences
Lemma 2 A spatial-temporal data table T satisfies LKC-privacy if and only if T contains no
MVS.
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Proof. Suppose a data table T does not satisfy LKC-privacy even if it contains no MVS. Then,
by Definition, table T contains a violating sequence. But, a violating sequence must be a MVS,
or its subset is MVS, which contradicts the initial assumption. Therefore, the data table T must
satisfy LKC-privacy.
Algorithm 1 presents a method to efficiently generate all the minimal violating sequences based
on a LKC-Privacy model. Line 1 puts all the size-1 sequences, i.e., all distinct doublets, as can-
didates X1 of MVS. Line 4 scans T once to compute |T (q)| and BPr(s|q) for each sequence
q ∈ Xi and for each sensitive value s ∈ S. If the sequence q violates the LKC-privacy require-
ment in Line 6, then we add q to the minimal violating sequences set Vi (Line 7); otherwise, we
add q to the non-violating sequence set Wi (Line 9) for generating the next candidate set Xi+1,
which is a self-join of Wi (Line 12). Two sequences qx = 〈(locx1tx1) → . . . → (locxi txi )〉 and
qy = 〈(locy1ty1) → . . . → (locyi tyi )〉 inWi can be joined only if the first i − 1 doublets of qx and qy
are identical and txi < t
y
i . The joined sequence is 〈(locx1tx1) → . . . → (locxi txi ) → (locyi tyi )〉. Lines
13-17 remove a candidate q from Xi+1 if q is a supersequence of any sequence in Vi because any
proper subsequence of a MVS cannot be a violating sequence. The set of VS, denoted by V (T ), is
the union of all Vi.
Example 5.1.1 Consider Table 1 withL = 2,K = 2, andC = 50%. SupposeX1 = {g2, b3, h7, e8}.
After scanning T , we divide X1 into V1 = ∅ andW1 = {g2, b3, h7, e8}. Next, fromW1 we gener-
ate the candidate set X2 = {g2b3, g2h7, g2e8, b3h7, b3e8, h7e8}. We scan T again to determine
V2 = {g2b3, b3e8}. We do not further generate X3 because L = 2.
Definition 5.1.1 (Violating doublet) A doublet p is a violating doublet if it is part of a violating
sequence.
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Algorithm 1 Generate minimal violating sequences
Input: Raw spatial-temporal data table T
Input: Thresholds L, K, and C
Input: Sensitive values S
Output: minimal violating sequence V (T )
1: X1 ← set of all distinct doublets in T ;
2: i = 1;
3: while i ≤ L and Xi ≠ ∅ do
4: Scan T to compute |T (q)| and BPr(s|q), for ∀q ∈ Xi, ∀s ∈ S;
5: for ∀q ∈ Xi where |T (q)| > 0 do
6: if |T (q)| < K or BPr(s|q) > C then
7: Add q to Vi;
8: else
9: Add q toWi;
10: end if
11: end for
12: Xi+1 ←Wi ⋊⋉Wi;
13: for ∀q ∈ Xi+1 do
14: if q is a super sequence of any v ∈ Vi then





20: return V (T ) = V1 ∪ . . . ∪ Vi−1;
Example 5.1.2 Given the set of minimal violating sequence, V (T ) = {g2b3, b3e8}, the violating
doublets are {g2, b3, e8}.
We have to remove all the violating sequences to satisfy the LKC-privacy requirement. We can
remove all the minimal violating sequences by suppressing a subset of violating doublets. Given,
V (T ) = {g2b3, b3e8}, we can either suppress {b3}, or {g2, e8}, and so on.
36
Algorithm 2 ST-Anonymizer
1: Supp = ∅;
2: while |V (T )| > 0 do
3: Select a doublet d with the maximum Score(d);
4: Suppress d;
5: Update Score(d′) if any sequence in V (T ) or F (T ) containing both d and d′;
6: end while
7: return Table T after suppressing doublets in Supp;
5.2 Spatial-Temporal Anonymizer
The elimination of violating sequences is achieved by suppressing a subset of doublets from the
table. Specifically, we employ the global suppression scheme [20] that was explained in chapter
3. Algorithm 2 provides an overview of the Spatial-Temporal (ST)-Anonymizer. The algorithm
iteratively selects a doublet d for suppression based on goodness function Score(d), updates the
Score(d) of remaining doublets, and terminates when all violating sequences have been elimi-
nated.
Intuitively, we prefer suppressing a doublet d that maximizes the number of eliminated violat-
ing sequences and minimizes the number of eliminated frequent sequences for suppression. Thus,
we define a greedy function Score(d) that quantifies the goodness of suppression of a doublet d
with respect to the number of eliminated violating sequences |V (d)| and the number of eliminated
frequent sequences |F (d)|.
Score(d) =
|V (d)|
|F (d)| . (1)
Score(d) =∞ in case F (d) = 0.
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5.3 Border Representation
The remaining challenge is to efficiently compute |V (d)| and |F (d)|. A naive approach is to first
enumerate all possible violating and frequent sequences and then count the number of sequences
containing d. Yet, Definitions 3.3.1 and 3.2 imply that the numbers of violating sequences and fre-
quent sequences grow exponentially with respect to the number of distinct doublets. Therefore, this
naive approach is not a feasible solution for a large dataset. We present a border-based approach
to have the compressed representations of the notions. The compression is lossless. A similar
approach was employed by [53] to represent itemsets, but we use borders to represent sequences
in this paper.
Definition 5.3.1 (Anti-chain) A set of sequences S is an anti-chain if ∀x, y ∈ S, x ⪯̸ y and
y ⪯̸ x.
Definition 5.3.2 (Border) An upper bound UB and a lower bound LB form a border, denoted by
[UB,LB], if (i) both UB and LB are anti-chains, (ii) each element of UB is a subsequence of
some element in LB, and (iii) each element of LB is a supersequence of some element in U . A
border [UB,LB] represents the set of sequences {z | ∃x ∈ U, ∃y ∈ L s.t. x ⪯ z ⪯ y}.
To show that the set of violating sequences V (T ) and the set of frequent sequences F (T ) are
representable by borders, we need to show that the borders are interval-closed.
Definition 5.3.3 (Interval-closed) A collection of sequences S is interval-closed if S contains all
sequences {z | ∀x, y ∈ S, ∀z, x ⪯ z ⪯ y}.
Observation 5.3.1 V (T ) and F (T ) are interval-closed.
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A violating sequence q is a minimal violating sequence (MVS) if every proper subsequence of
q is not a violating sequence. The violating sequence and frequent sequence borders are defined as
follows:
Definition 5.3.4 (Violating sequence (VS) border) The violating sequence (VS) border consists
of an upper bound UB and a lower bound LB, where UB contains all minimal violating sequences
and LB contains all maximal sequences y with support |T (y)| ≥ 1.
Definition 5.3.5 (Frequent sequence (FS) border) The frequent sequence (FS) border consists
of an upper bound UB and a lower bound LB, where UB contains all singleton doublets d with
support |T (d)| ≥ max(K,K ′), and LB contains all maximal sequences y with support |T (y)| ≥
K ′.
The process of identifying a border [UB,LB] for an interval-closed collection has been studied
in [15]. The process of identifying minimal violating sequences has been studied in [35] and is
explained in Section 5.1. A border [UB,LB] can be represented by a set of edges {〈x, y〉 | x ∈
UB, y ∈ LB, x ⪯ y}.
5.4 Counting Function
Suppose a doublet d has been suppressed in Line 4 in Algorithm 2. We need to efficiently compute
the Score(d′) of the remaining doublets d′ that share the same violating or frequent sequences with
d. Specifically, |V (d′)| and |F (d′)| are decreased by the number of violating/frequent sequences
containing both d and d′ because such sequences have been eliminated. The question is how to
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compute such numbers from the borders without materializing the actual sequences. Equation 2
returns the number of sequences with maximum length L that are supersequences of a given se-
quence q and are covered by a border [UB,LB] [53].
NLq ([UB,LB]) = {z | z ∈ [UB,LB], q ⪯ z, |z| ≤ L}. (2)
Consider a single edge 〈x, y〉 in a border. Equation 3 returns the number of sequences with maxi-
mum length L that are covered by 〈x, y〉 and are supersequences of a given sequence q.




P (|y − (x ⋓ q)|, i),
(3)
where ⋓ unions two sequences and sorts the doublets by their timestamps, P (n, i) = n!
(n−i)! , and
m = min(|y − (x ⋓ q)|, L− |x ⋓ q|). (4)
In the special case of x = ∅ and L = ∞, N(〈x, y〉) = 2|y−x| returns the number of sequences
covered by 〈x, y〉.
Example 5.4.1 Refer to the edge 〈b4→ f5, g2→ a3→ b4→ f5〉 in Figure 7. Suppose we want
to suppress the sequence q = 〈b4→ f5〉 with L = 3. Thus, we have |x| = 2, |y| = 4, |q| = 2, and
m = min(|g2→ a3→ b4→ f5|−|(b4→ f5⋓b4→ f5)|, 3−|(b4→ f5⋓b4→ f5)|) = 1. The
number of sequences removed due to the suppression is NLq (〈x, y〉) =
1∑
i=0
P (|y− (x⋓ q)|, i) = 3,
namely 〈b4→ f5〉, 〈a3→ b4→ f5〉, and 〈g2→ b4→ f5〉.
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Figure 7: Violating Sequence Border
However, computingNLq ([UB,LB]) by simply summing upN
L
q (〈x, y〉) over all edges 〈x, y〉 in
[UB,LB] is incorrect because a sequence may be covered by multiple edges, and we cannot count
the same sequence more than once. Xu et al. [53] introduced two operations, edge intersection and
edge difference, to remove duplicate counting.
5.5 Border-based Suppression Algorithm
We now present our border-based suppression algorithm. Initially, E is the set of all edges 〈x, y〉
in the border. d is the doublet to be suppressed with d ∈ y. d′ denotes any other doublet in the
suppressed sequence. E∗ is the set of unexamined edges (initially E). E∧ is the set of examined
edges (initially empty). Supp denotes the set of doublets to be suppressed. The algorithm itera-
tively suppresses sequences in E∗ until all violating sequences are eliminated. It makes one pass
of the edges in E∗. At each step, we consider the next edge 〈x, y〉 in E∗. Count the number of sup-
pressed sequences, called losers, containing dd′ that are covered by 〈x, y〉 but not covered by any
(examined) edge in E∧, and increment δ(d′) by the count. Then move 〈x, y〉 from E∗ to E∧. This
process is repeated until E∗ becomes empty. The final δ(d′) gives the number of losers containing
dd’.
We summarize the main steps of Algorthim 2 as follows:
41
1. Select the doublet to be suppressed: Select doublet d not contained in Suppwith maximum
Score. Add d to Supp.
2. Get affected edges: Retrieve E(d) = {〈x, y〉, d ∈ y}. Set E∗ = E(d), E∧ = ⊘
3. Compute number of affected sequences: The counting function returns the number of af-
fected sequences (losers) by the current suppression to update the score. Consider Algorithm
3. Before it increases the score, it identifies the set of all edges in E∧ that overlap with cur-
rent edge 〈x, y〉, denoted by ovset = {e∧|e∧ ∈ E∧ such that 〈x, y〉 ⋒ e∧ ≠ ∅}. To exclude
the losers covered by ovset, consider in three cases:
Case 1: |ovset| = 0. The losers covered by 〈x, y〉 are not covered by E∧, so NLq (〈x, y〉)
gives the number of new losers containing dd′, where q = dd′ and len = L, the maximum
length of the sequence. We update δ(d′) to δ(d′) +NLq (〈x, y〉).
Case 2: |ovset| = 1. In this case, only one edge in E∧, say e∧, has overlap with 〈x, y〉. The
number of losers covered by both 〈x, y〉 and e∧ is given by NLq (〈x, y〉 ⋒ e∧), where q = dd′,
len = L. We increment δ(d′) by NLq (〈x, y〉 − NLq (〈x, y〉 ⋒ e∧), where ⋒ is the intersection
of two edges.
Case 3: |ovset| > 1. In this case, more than one edge in E∧ has overlap with 〈x, y〉.
Simply excluding the intersections 〈x, y〉 ⋒ e∧ for every e∧ in ovset does not work because
intersections themselves might have intersection(s). Therefore, we pick any e∧ in ovset and
compute 〈x, y〉 ⋒ e∧. This edge difference can be replaced with a set of new edges denoted
by newset. Then we recursively count the losers covered by the unexamined E∗ = newset
but not by the examined E∧ = ovset−e∧. The recursion terminates in either Case 1 or Case
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Algorithm 3 Suppressing a Sequence
1: Procedure Compute δ(newset, ovset− {e∧}, v, len, δ);
2: while E* is not empty do
3: Pick any edge e∗ = 〈x, y〉 from E∗;
4: let ovset = edges in E∧∩ e∗;
5: if |ovset| = 0 then /*case 1*/ then
6: δ(d‘) = δ(d′) +NLq (e∗), for d′ ∈ y − d;
7: else if |ovset| = 1 then /*case 2*/ then
8: let e∧ be the edge in ovset
9: δ(d′) = NLq (∗)−NLq (e∗ ∩ e∧) , for d′ ∈ y − d;
10: else if |ovset| > 1 then /*case 3*/ then
11: pick any edge e∧ from ovset;
12: set newest = e∗ − e∧ ;
13: Computeδ(newset, ovset− {e∧}, v, len, δ);
14: end if
15: move E* from E* to E∧;
16: end while
2.
4. Update Score: For every doublet in d′, decrease |V S(d′)| by δ(d′).
5. Update the border: This step removes all violating sequences containing d from V S border.
For each 〈x, y〉 in E(d), if d ∈ x, delete x from the upper bound of the border and delete all
attached edges; if d /∈ x, replace y by y′=y-d, delete y′ if y′⊆ y′′ for some y′′ on the lower
bound.




The main objective of our empirical study is to evaluate the performance of our proposed archi-
tecture and ST-Anonymizer in terms of utility loss caused by anonymization and scalability for
handling large datasets. The utility loss is defined as |F (T )|−|F (T )
′|
|F (T )| , where |F (T )| and |F (T )′|
are the numbers of frequent sequences before and after the anonymization of the dataset T . We
converted the data into relational data and attempted to apply the state-of-the-art anonymization
algorithms, such as [22] [31] [46]. Unfortunately, all of these methods were not scalable to high
dimensionality and failed to finish the anonymization.
We conducted the experiments on the Metro100K dataset, which simulates the travel routes of
100,000 passengers in the Montreal subway transit system with 65 stations in 60 minutes, forming
3,900 dimensions. Each record in the dataset corresponds to the route of one passenger. The
passengers’ traffic patterns are simulated based on information obtained from the Montreal metro
information website1. Based on the published annual report, all of the passengers have an average
1http://www.metrodemontreal.com
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spatial-temporal path length of 8 stations. The data generator also simulates the paths according to
the current metro map and passengers’ flow in each station. Each record contains an attribute with
five possible values, one of which is considered to be sensitive.
6.1 Utility Loss
Following the convention for extracting frequent sequences, we specify the minimum support
threshold at K ′ = 0.5%, K ′ = 1.0%, and 1.5% and vary the thresholds of minimum anonymity
K, maximum confidence C, and maximum adversary’s knowledge L to evaluate the performance
of the algorithm.
Figure 8 depicts the utility loss for K from 10 to 50 while fixing L = 3 and C = 60%. The
utility loss stays flat with respect to the increase of K. As the K ′ increases from 0.5% to 1.5%,
the number of frequent sequences decreases and the utility loss increases from 3% to 31% because
a global suppression on a doublet generates a larger impact. Figure 9 depicts the utility loss for
C from 20% to 100% while fixing L = 3 and K = 30. Approximately one-fifth of the records
contain a sensitive value, so the utility loss is high at C = 20%. As C increases, the effect of
attribute linkages becomes insignificant. AsK ′ increases, the utility loss drops quickly due to less
overlapping between F (T ) and V (T ). Figure 10 depicts the utility loss for L from 1 to 9 while
fixing K = 30 and C = 60%. As L increases, the LKC-privacy requirement becomes harder to







































































(c) Utility Loss vs. K (with L = 3, C = 60%, k′ = 1.5%)
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(c) Utility Loss vs. C (with L = 3,K = 30, k′ = 1.5%)
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(c) Utility Loss vs. L (withK = 30, C = 60%, k′ = 1.5%)
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Figure 11: Runtime vs. number of records
6.2 Scalability
Every previous test case can finish the entire anonymization process within 15 seconds. We further
evaluate scalability with respect to data volume and dimensionality. We fix L = 3, K = 30,
C = 60%, and K ′ = 1%. Figure 11 depicts the runtime in seconds of from 200,000 to 1 million
records. The total runtime for anonymizing 1 million records is 125 seconds, of which 46 seconds
are spent identifying minimal violating sequences (MVS) and 79 seconds are spent reading the raw
dataset and writing the anonymous dataset. It takes less than 1 second to suppress all the violating
sequences V (T ). As the number of records increases from 200,000 towards 1 million, the runtime
for read/write and identifyingMVS also increases linearly, suggesting that our algorithm is scalable
to anonymize large datasets. This high performance is due to the efficiency of computing the
number of covered sequences by edges instead of enumerating such sequences. This eliminates
the need to store all frequent sequences and violating sequences in memory, which is the real
bottleneck due to the exponential blowup of |F (T )| and V (T )|. All experiments are conducted on
a PC with Intel Core2 Duo 1.6GHz CPU with 2GB of RAM.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
We have studied the problem of privacy-preserving spatial-temporal data sharing and have pro-
posed a service-oriented architecture together with an anonymization algorithm to simultaneously
preserve both privacy and information utility for data mining. Applying K-anonymity on high-
dimensional data, such as the spatial-temporal data in our experiments, would result in a high
utility loss. To overcome the problem, we adopt a LKC-privacy model based on a practical as-
sumption that an adversary has limited background knowledge about the victim. Furthermore,
we propose a border-based anonymization method to compress the large number of violating and
frequent sequences into a compact format to ensure the scalability of the system.
For our future work, we would like to develop a secure protocol to integrate distributed spatial-
temporal data owned by different location-based service providers, such that the integrated data
satisfies a privacy model such as LKC-privacy.
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